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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE 0F THE CASE AND COURSE 0F PROCEEDINGS
The underlying matter

an action for divorce with minor children.

is

ﬁled petition for Divorce 0n December 18, 2017.
Counterpetition on January

2018.

8,

Respondent/Appellant ﬁled an

Reply

Amended

t0 Counterpetition

Fact

and

0f

Conclusions

was ﬁled 0n January

Counterpetition July 25, 2018.

A two-day trial was held 0n November
0f

Respondent/Appellant ﬁled a Response and

agreement 0n October

parties reached a partial settlement

Law on

Petitioner/Appellee

1-2,

Through mediation

11, 2018.

2018 and the

January

10, 2018.

22,

trial

court entered

On

2019.

its

February

Findings

2018,

4,

Respondent/Appellant ﬁled a Motion to Reconsider/Motion t0 Re-Open Evidence/Motion for

New

Final Judgment

Trial.

was entered

May 2,

2019.

was entered March

On June

5,

2019 the

19,

trial

2019 and an Order 0n Motion
court entered an

Respondent/Appellant ﬁled timely Notice of Appeal t0 the

and subsequently ﬁled Motion for Permissive Appeal 0n June
the motion

0n July

9,

17,

district court

2019. The

on June

trial

II.

FACTS
Petitioner/Appellee

Mark

("Sydney") were married June

child,

who was born

time of

10,

2019

court granted

2019. Notice 0f Appeal t0 the Idaho Supreme Court was then ﬁled 0n July

2019, and the matter was assigned t0 the Court 0f Appeals on August 13, 2019.

at the

Reconsider

Amended Judgment.

19,

and 5

t0

trial.

7,

Franklin ("Mark") and Respondent/Appellant Sydney Franklin

2008.

Parties are the parents 0f

two minor

children,

At the time of marriage, Sydney was pregnant with the

later that year.

The

parties’

second child was born in 2013.

aged 10

parties‘ ﬁrst

The

separated in October 20 1 7.

Appellant's Brief
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1

parties

Mg
During the early years of their oldest child’s
child due t0 his

result

life,

Mark

work schedule and general discomfort around

babies. (Tr. p. 33, 67, 329.)

of this, Sydney was the primary attachment ﬁgure for the

to

bond with a young

child,

329-3 1 .)

Sydney.

(Tr. p. 33,

paternal

bond with them.

life.

child,

Mark worked long hours

(Tr. p. 67-8,

325) and struggled

(Tr. p. 329.)

parties mutually agreed t0 put the

Mark has developed an

older,

a

and the bulk of the child-

and so the bulk 0f the child-rearing responsibilities once again

As both boys have grown

As

This dynamic continued into the

raising responsibilities fell to her. (Tr. p. 192, 214, 329-31.)

early years 0f their second child’s

bond With the

struggled t0 form a

Once Sydney began working

fell to

appropriate

for the parties’ business, the

boys into daycare 0n a part-time

basis. This

was

in part to

allow Sydney alone time to perform her bookkeeping responsibilities and in part so that their
children could

make

friends

and be exposed

t0 people

beyond

their family. (Tr. p. 198-99, 355-

56).

The

parties separated in

October 2017. Between October 2017 and December 2017, the

boys lived primarily with Sydney while Mark stayed with a
2017, the same month
splitting

p.

for divorce,

custody on a 50/50 basis. (Tr.

term, she

(Tr.

Mark ﬁled

was overwhelmed by

351,

383.)

The

approximately 11 months
utilized family

members

with custodial time got

PBL\4819-8678-7749.V1-9/12/19

Although

want

this

to

that they

time 0f trial. (Tr.

p.

December

would begin

was not What Sydney wanted long

ﬁght with Mark about the children.

had shared equal physical custody 0f

their

children for

214, 350-5 1 .) During this time, both parties

to varying degrees to care for the children after daycare until the parent

home from work.

Appellant's Brief

Mark informed Sydney

the divorce and did

parties

at the

p. 350.)

friend. (Tr. p. 350.) In

(Tr. p. 256,

265-66, 383, 392.)

2

Parties’ Relationship

The

parties

went through several “rough patches” during

parties argued about

and other

issues.

Mark’s alcohol and marijuana use, Sydney’s cleaning and spending

(Tr. p. 35, 40, 43, 48,

Sydney would accuse him 0f being a “womanizer”,

him and claw him
names such

(Tr. Tr. p. 48-9.)

in anger.

as “bitch”,

The

habits,

204-05, 333.) Both parties testiﬁed t0 incidents where

the parties threatened 0r taunted each other With a ﬁrearm.

that

their marriage. (Tr. p. 32.)

(Tr. p. 48-9, 341-42.)

Mark testiﬁed

and would “jump 0n”

(Tr. p. 40, 50, 59),

Over the years Mark regularly called Sydney

“whore” and “cunt”, and referred

t0 her frequently as “stupid.”

(Tr. p.

339-40.)

Sydney testiﬁed

that marital rape

was a weekly occurrence during

marriage, (Tr. p. 336-39), stating, “If Mark wanted t0 have sex and

r011

me

2-4.)

over and rip

She testiﬁed

my pants

and

in detail about

the parties separation, breaking

my underwear down

I

didn't

the last part 0f their

want

t0,

and d0 what he wanted.”

he would just
(Tr. p. 339,

1.

one incident that occurred approximately one month prior to

down

in tears

on the witness

stand.

Sydney

(Tr. p. 336-37.)

testiﬁed that she did not report these incidents of domestic Violence because throughout their

marriage

Mark

repeatedly told her that he

what he wanted.

(Tr. p. 337,

1.

8-14.)

Sydney grew

useless to report his behavior t0 anyone.

and accused her of lying

Mark admitted
Mark testiﬁed

to get

that

he drank too

PBL\4819-8678-7749.V1-9/12/19

to believe that

(Tr. p. 339, 378-79.)

What she wants.

that since separating

Appellant's Brief

was a master manipulator and could

much

was

true

Mark denied

get anyone to d0

and ﬁgured

it

was

ever raping Sydney

(Tr. p. 407, 409.)

alcohol during the marriage. (Tr. p. 241 404-406.)

from Sydney, he does not drink as frequently as he once

3

did.

(Tr. p. 202,

Mark

204, 406.)

approximately two years prior t0

trial. (Tr. p.

Sydney struggled with an eating
268-69.)

and body.

life

until

201 .)

disorder,

which had

started prior t0 marriage.

(Tr. p. 35,

This intensiﬁed during the marriage, particularly in response t0 regular marital rape

and emotional abuse.
her

was a frequent user of marijuana up

also testiﬁed that he

Sydney testiﬁed

(Tr. p. 340.)

(Tr. p. 340,

1.

that

food was a

Since separation from

6-14.)

and completed a course of treatment for her eating disorder.

way of having

control over

Mark Sydney gained 26 pounds

(Tr. p.

340-41 .)

Work History and Income
Both
enrolled in a

9—week dental

their marriage,

company

have high school level educations.

parties

assistant

Sydney worked

program

at the

time 0f trial. (Tr.

called Rooftop Solutions. (Tr. p. 209, 321-22.)

Mark

(Tr. p. 322.)

After

Mark

Once

sister-in-law.

Rooftop Solutions
(Tr. p.

210-1

after

Franklin Freelance, an S-corporation that does business as
Exhibit Rec. Vol.

from April 2014

until

After her

for

1, p.

Sydney worked

December 2016.

work ended

minimum wage.

in April 2018,

59, 64-5.)

at

t0

the time 0f

was born, Sydney

work long hours

as a roofer.

he was caught inappropriately

in

2014

to start their

Roof Rescue.

part time as the

text-

own

business,

(Tr. p. 102, 209,

232;

bookkeeper for Roof Rescue

(Tr. p. 193, 323.)

Roof Rescue, Sydney began working

(Tr. p. 323.)

At

1 .)

Mark and Sydney decided

10st his job,

their ﬁrst child

mother While Mark continued

quit his job at

messaging his boss’s

p. 3 19-20.)

Melaleuca for $8.50 an hour and Mark worked for a rooﬁng

at

quit her job to be a stay—at-home

Sydney was

319,360-61.)

(Tr. p.

Once

part-time at a coffee shop

the parties separated, she got a part time job at Dillard’s

where she was earning approximately $12.00 an hour.

(Tr. p.

323-24) At the time

0f trial, Sydney was temporarily working for a construction company in Victor, Idaho for $16.00
an hour.

(Tr. p. 286, 324.)

Appellant's Brief
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Sydney testiﬁed

that this

arrangement was not ideal but that she did
4

it

t0 provide for herself

in

and her children

November 2018 and then

until she could graduate

employment

obtain

from a dental

in that ﬁeld.

assistant

program
She was

(Tr. p. 278, 324.)

pursuing dental assisting because the work schedule would allow her to have more time With her
kids.

(Tr. p. 354, 393-94.) Prior to entry

to further

0f ﬁnal judgment Sydney

left

her job in Victor in order

minimize any time away from the children and had found part-time employment as a

dental assistant in accordance with her original plan. (R.

From

the start 0f Roof Rescue

workweeks, including weekends and

V01

Mark worked long

3, p.

495-96.)

hours, regularly working 60 to 70-hour

late nights. (Tr. p. 68-9,

220-25 1 .) Mark testiﬁed that

about 2017/2018 he worked “daylight t0 dark” getting the business off the ground. (Tr.

He

testiﬁed that since the parties separated, he

from 7:00 am.

t0 5:00

pm,

(Tr. p. 70),

now works

until

p. 68.)

approximately 50 hours per week,

though testimony by Mark’s mother and the daycare

provider established that he frequently works longer hours, particularly 0n weekends. (Tr. p. 2324, 266.) Mark’s gross income, including salary and pass—through income,

2017 was $149,773.00. (Exhibit Rec. Vol
greater

now

that

Mark

will

1, p.

93, 99.)

The pass—through income

income.
travel,

Will

in

be even

be sole owner 0f the company. Mark also enjoys substantial beneﬁts

and perks as the owner 0f Roof Rescue. Mark uses a business
personal expenses, which

from Roof Rescue

is

(Tr. 178-81, 326.)

credit card for business

and

paid by the business and thus not included in his K-l pass—through

The business pays

and even the occasional liquor

for things like his truck, cell phone, meals, gas,

store Visit. (Tr. 178-81, 326; Exhibit Rec. V01.

1,

p.1 1-32,

106-07.)

Lifestyle

During the Marriage

Mark and Sydney began supplementing
marriage and both grew accustomed to this

Appellant's Brief
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their lifestyle

lifestyle

With Roof Rescue resources during the

during the marriage. (Tr. p. 178-81, 326, 399.)

5

The business

was used

credit card

purchases, and the business

for eating out,

would pay off the

groceries,

fuel,

and educational

fees, this

marriage, including those paid

0f $3,285.00.

by

was based 0n

1, p. 9.)

and other

With the exception of
had during

actual expenses the parties

the business. (Tr. p. 326-27.)

(Tr. 89-93; Exhibit R. Vol. 1, p. 152.)

his true lifestyle.

furniture

card. (Tr. p. 326.)

Sydney presented a budget 0f $6,405.00. (Exhibit Rec. Vol.
legal fees

hotels,

However,

Mark presented
this

budget

their

a monthly budget

fails to

accurately reﬂect

Throughout the year Mark makes personal purchases Which are paid by the

business and then later written off as a business expense for tax purposes. This includes meals,
his truck

payment, gas, Lyft rides and liquor purchases.

(Tr. 178-81, 326; Exhibit

Rec. V01.

1, p.

11-40, 106-07.)

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the
minor

2.

ON APPEAL

trial

court abused

its

discretion in awarding Petitioner primary custody 0f the

children.

Whether the

trial

court erred as a matter 0f law in ﬁnding that Respondent’s allegations

0f domestic Violence were not entitled t0 any weight.
3.

Whether the

trial

court abused

during the marriage With

its

its

discretion in replacing the standard 0f living established

own

opinion as t0 what Respondent’s standard 0f living

should be in analyzing spousal maintenance.
4.

Whether the

5.

Whether the

trial

trial

court erred in failing t0 award spousal maintenance to Respondent.
court erred in applying a frivolousness standard instead 0f conducting

an analysis 0f the factors required under Idaho Code §§ 32-704 and 32-705 in addressing
Respondent’s request for attorney

Appellant's Brief
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fees.

6

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The

determination

sound discretion of the
1055 (2003).

Hoskinson

discretion.

A
Perez

v.

trial

Hoskinson
is

v.

is

committed

the

to

abused, the court's judgment as t0 custody will not be

Levin, 122 Idaho 583, 586, 836 P.2d 529, 532 (1992).

v.

award 0r denial 0f spousal maintenance

is

reviewed for an abuse 0f

Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 462, 80 P.3d 1049, 1063 (2003).

v.

is

reviewed for an abuse 0f discretion.

Perez, 134 Idaho 555, 6 P.3d 411 (Ct.App. 2000).

reviewing a

whether the

trial

court’s decision for abuse 0f discretion the appellate court

court acted within the outer boundaries 0f

decision

by an

1049, 1055 (2003).

exercise of reason.

An

must

court correctly perceived the issue as one 0f discretion; (2) whether the

trial

its

discretion

standards applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available t0

its

children

Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 454, 80 P.3d 1049,

decision whether or not t0 award attorney fees

When
ask, (1)

trial court.

court’s

trial

minor

the custody 0f

Unless such discretion

upset on appeal. Levin

The

0f

Hoskinson

v.

it;

and

and consistently with the

(3)

Whether the

trial

legal

court reached

Hoskinson, 139 Idaho 448, 454, 8O P.3d

abuse 0f discretion will be found

if the magistrate’s

ﬁndings 0f fact are

not supported by substantial evidence or if the magistrate does not correctly apply the law.

Moﬂett

v.

Moﬂett, 151 Idaho 90, 93, 253 P.3d 764, 767

(Ct.

Blaser, 102 Idaho 559, 561-62, 633 P.2d 1137, 1139-40 (1981)).
also occur

Where the court overemphasizes one

factor

App 201 1)(Citing

Nicholls

"[A]n abuse of discretion

v.

may

thereby similarly failing to support

its

conclusion that the welfare and interests of a child Will be best served by a particular custody
award."

Moye

A trial

v.

Moye, 102 Idaho 170, 172, 627 P.2d 799, 801 (1981).

court's

ﬁndings of

fact Will not

be

set aside unless clearly erroneous,

Which

is

t0

say that ﬁndings that are based upon substantial and competent, although conﬂicting, evidence

Appellant's Brief
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7

will not be disturbed

922, 925 (1999).

court,

on appeal. DeChambeau

The

credibility

and the appellate court

and weight

recitations

to

Estate

omeith, 132 Idaho 568, 571, 976 P.2d

be given evidence

However, n0 deference

Magnuson

H.F.

v.

is

given t0 the

0f each party’s testimony. Searle

v.

is

in the province

ﬁndings of

liberally construes the trial court's

judgment entered. Bouten Constr. C0.
755 (1999).

v.

0f the

fact in favor

trial

of the

C0,, 133 Idaho 756, 760,

992 P.2d 751,

when

they are mere

trial

court’s ﬁndings

Searle, 162 Idaho 839, 847, 405 P.3d 1180, 1188

(2017).

When

the issue

is

one of law, the appellate court exercises free review of the

trial court's

Bouten C0ntr., Supra.

decision.

ARGUMENT
I.

THE MAGISTRATE FAILED T0 MAKE FINDINGS 0F FACT
In the Magistrate’s Findings

make

failed t0

and Conclusions, entered January

actual ﬁndings 0f fact.

(Rec. V01. 3, p. 472-483.)

22, 2019, the Magistrate

Under

the heading “Findings

and Conclusions” the Magistrate merely recited ﬁve pages 0f evidence from the record

that could

be used t0 support a ﬁnding, without an afﬁrmative statement that the court was ﬁnding the
testiﬁed

v.

City

This

t0.

ofSun

is

not sufﬁcient t0 constitute ﬁndings of

Valley,

the court

[.

.

.],

state.

which

Crown Point Development,

144 Idaho 72,77-78, 156 P.3d 573, 578 (2007).

court or agency does not

agency should so

fact.

ﬁnd
Id.,

a fact unless the testimony

144 Idaho

fact is averted

must be founded 0n the evidence

at 77.

by one party and denied by

Appellant's Brief
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is

fact is a determination

reciting testimony, a

a determination of a fact

v.

Elliott,

Searle, 162 Idaho 839, 846,

of a

fact

by

the other and this determination

in the case." Id. (Quoting, C.I.T. Corp.

v.

Inc.

unrebutted in Which case the court or

"A ﬁnding of fact

397, 159 P.2d 891, 897 (1945)). See also, Searle

1187 (2017)( "A ﬁnding of

is

By

facts

66 Idaho 384,

405 P.3d 1180,

supported by the evidence in the

8

record")

A

statement that "merely recite[s] portions of the record Which could be used in

support 0f a ﬁnding"

Inc.

v.

City

ofSun

is

not a ﬁnding 0f fact. Searle, 162 Idaho at 846 (Citing

Valley, 144 Idaho 72, 77, 156 P.3d 573,

In Searle, the trial court presented a

list

0f

Crown Point Dev.,

578 (2007)).
with n0 indication

facts presented at trial,

Which were unrebutted and Which were ﬁndings 0f the court based on contested evidence. The
trial

court then listed the I.C. § 32-717 best interest factors, with a

list

of relevant

record under each of the factors, failing t0 engage in a thorough analysis.

held that this was insufﬁcient to support a decision. Searle, 162 Idaho

The Magistrate’s Findings and Conclusions, upon Which

Amended Final Judgment were

Which

facts

from the

The Supreme Court

846-47.

the Final

Judgment and

based, similarly consist of a recitation 0f facts, followed

another recitation 0f facts categorized
indicate

at

facts

by

the I.C. § 32-717 factors.

were unrebutted, nor did he indicate which

on contested testimony. While there was some limited analysis
such limited analysis was not sufﬁcient to support a decision.

by

The Magistrate did not

facts constituted

ﬁndings based

in the Magistrate’s conclusions,

Searle, supra.

The Magistrate

abused his discretion by awarding primary physical custody t0 Mark, denying spousal
maintenance and denying attorney fees Without making ﬁndings 0f fact and engaging in a
thorough analysis based on those ﬁndings.
II.

THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN HIS TREATMENT 0F DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
The Magistrate discounted, and excluded from

his consideration, Sydney’s allegations 0f

domestic Violence with the following terse statement:

Sydney claims

that

Mark raped

She did not identify that in her discovery
The ﬁrst time the Court was aware is when
The Court does not put much weight t0 this allegation.
her.

responses. She did not call the police.

she brought this up at

Appellant's Brief
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trial.

9

Findings and Conclusions

(Rec. V01. 3, p. 479.)

at 8.

This cavalier treatment 0f domestic

Violence impacted the Magistrate’s determinations regarding child custody, spousal maintenance

and attorney fees and was

error.

Pertaining t0 child custody, Idaho

which may

relevant factors

all

LC.

Code

32-7 17 provides that “The court shall consider

include... [d]0mestic Violence as

“Domestic Violence”

§ 32-717(1)(g).

§

is

deﬁned

in section 39-6303.”

as “the physical injury, sexual abuse or

deﬁned

forced imprisonment 0r threat thereof 0f a family or household member, or of a minor child

by

Whom

a person With

adult

by

a person with

6303(1). There

0f the parents

is

is

the minor child has had 0r

whom the

adult has

abuse of a spouse

is

environment, and

Mark

fees under

LC.

d0.”

§

having a dating relationship, 0r 0f an

having a dating relationship.” LC.

is

§

39-6303 was present in

have considered.

§

39—

not in the best interest of a child if one

a habitual perpetrator of domestic Violence.

factor that the Magistrate should

I

is

a presumption that joint custody

domestic Violence as defined in LC.

emulates What

had 0r

is

Since

32-717B(5).

I.C. §

this matter,

it

was

a relevant

Appellant also argues that emotional

a relevant factor in this matter, since the children

were exposed

to this

testiﬁed that the parties’ oldest son “watches, and then he kind 0f

(Tr. p. 30,

1

1-2.)

In the realms of spousal maintenance and attorney

32-704, domestic Violence

is

relevant under two speciﬁc factors:

the

emotional condition 0f the spouse seeking maintenance, LC. § 32-705 (2)(d), and the fault 0f
either party. I.C. § 32-705(2)(g).

Sydney testiﬁed about repeated marital
incident

Which occurred a month prior

rape, including testifying in detail about

t0 separation.

claims of rape, accusing Sydney 0f lying. (Tr.

p.

(Tr. p.

407, 409.)

When

previously reported the incidences 0f rape, Sydney testiﬁed that

Appellant's Brief
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336-37, 339.)
questioned

Mark

“told

me

Mark denied

Why

one
the

she had not

for years

10

he was

a master manipulator and that he could

N0

against his.

one would believe me.”

Sydney testiﬁed

contradicted.

make anyone

considered domestic Violence.

(Tr. p. 337,

that she did not

(Tr. p.

believe anything he said.

know

Sydney

394.)

regularly being belittled and called vulgar

8-14; 378-79.)

1.

And

it’s

my word

This testimony was not

until recently that marital rape

was

also testiﬁed t0 emotional abuse, 0f

names by Mark.

(Tr. p. 339-40.)

Mark

did not at any

time deny the allegations of demeaning Sydney, instead alleging that Sydney had used similar

words

t0 describe his mother.

(Tr. p. 406.)

A. Abuse 0f Discretion.

The Magistrate
160 Idaho

10,

is

tasked with weighing the credibility 0f a Witness, Alexander

368 P.3d 630 (2016); Salazar

v.

v.

Stibal,

110 Idaho 584, 716 P.2d 1356 (Ct.App.

Tilley,

1986), and “must accept as true the positive, uncontradicted testimony 0f a credible witness,

unless his testimony

is

inherently improbable 0r impeached."

339 P.3d 1109, 1117 (2014)(quoting Russ
(1974)).

v.

Reed

v.

Reed, 157 Idaho 705, 713,

Brown, 96 Idaho 369, 373, 529 P.2d 765, 769

The Magistrate made n0 ﬁndings with regard

t0

Sydney’s credibility as a witness. The

Magistrate refused to give any weight to the testimony of marital rape simply because Sydney

had not previously disclosed the

allegations.

Findings and Conclusions

at 8.

(Rec. V01. 3, p.

479.) And, despite the fact that Sydney’s testimony 0f emotional abuse and Mark’s manipulative

nature

was unrebutted,

It is

the Magistrate failed t0 give

it

any consideration whatsoever.

well established that a large percentage of Victims 0f sexual assault and domestic

Violence never report the incidents t0 law enforcement. S.K.C.

A.3d

402,

415,

n.17

(2014)

("More

often

d0 not report the abuse because they believe

would

intensify.");

Wildoner
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v.

it is

than

not,

v.

J.L.C.,

2014

PA

Super 126, 94

female domestic Violence Victims

a private matter or for fear that the Violence

Borough ofRamsey, 162

N.J. 375, 392-93,

744 A.2d 1146, 1156

11

(2000)

(“It is

d0 not report

well documented

their

that, for

a

number 0f reasons, Victims 0f domestic Violence

abuse t0 law enforcement ofﬁcers”); State

Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 191,

v.

A.2d 364 (1984)(“FBI and other law enforcement experts believe
unreported crime in the United States."); People

1082(A)(NY

Nassau 2006)(“[A] delay

Dist.

failure to report at all, is a

legion

hallmark 0f

v.

that wife abuse is the

many Domestic

and

in

many

Violence incidents. In

immediately report an incident”). Estimates range from only

& Ann W.

are reported t0 police);

5%-56%

treated

by emergency department

that as

few

staff);

as

fail to

0f domestic Violence and

Understanding Violence Against

Statistics

ﬁve percent of battered women

Lawrence A. Greenfeld

Analysis 0f Data 0n Crimes by Current 0r

Former Spouses,

et al.,

Women

117

are identiﬁed

and

Violence by Intimates:

Boyfriends,

and

Girlfriends, in

Factbook. Washington DC: U.S. Department 0f Justice [NCJ

#167237] (1998) (Only half 0f domestic Violence incidents are reported

common

a

American Medical Association, When Someone You Love Hurts You, 280

488 (1998) (estimating

to police,

With the most

reasons for not reporting domestic Violence to police are that Victims View the incident

as a personal 0r private matter, they fear retaliation

that police Will

a1.,

fact, there are

Burgess, eds., 1996) (only ﬁfty-six percent of battering incidents

JAMA

Bureau 0f Justice

most

instances a complete

0f plausible reasons that a complainant in a Domestic Violence case would

(Nancy A. Crowell

478

Biggio, 819 N.Y.S.2d 850, 11 Misc.3d

in reporting,

only 15.8%-35% 0f sexual assaults are reported.

often

their abuser,

and they do not believe

do anything about the incident); U.S. Bureau of Justice

Female Victims ofSexual

0f Rape 0n the Rise?
Experiences

from

in the
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Violence, 1994-2010, (2013); Wolitzky-Taylor et

A Comparison

National

Statistics,

Women ’s

a1,

M.
Is

Planty et

Reporting

0f Women with Reported Versus Unreported Rape

Study Replication, 2010; Rennison, C. A., Rape and sexual

12

assault: Reporting t0 police

and medical

attention,

1992-2000 [NCJ 194530] (2002). (Sixty three

percent (63%) 0f sexual assaults go unreported to police.)

To
by

the Magistrate’s decision,

or

deem an

it is

allegation of domestic Violence

legal requirement that

were a number 0f other
such as the facts
early days, that

and rape not credible because

trial.

facts relevant t0 matter that

t0 trial.

It

was not reported

t0

should be noted that there

were not disclosed

t0 the court until trial

was not bonded

marijuana, drank heavily,

Sydney had an eating

it

In addition, as will be further argued herein, there

Sydney disclose them prior

Mark smoked

express or implied

simply unconscionable in the modern era for a court t0 ignore

police or disclosed to the court prior to

was n0

may be

the extent ﬁndings regarding credibility of the allegations

disorder, or that she

commuted

for

-

to his children in the

work

—

yet the Court

considered that testimony in rendering a decision.
In disregarding

evidence of domestic Violence, the Magistrate reached a decision

inconsistent With applicable legal standards and failed t0 reach his decision

reason. Therefore the decision

was an abuse of discretion and should be

by an

exercise of

reversed.

B. Error as a Matter 0f Law

As argued above,

the Magistrate did not base his refusal t0

weigh the

allegations of

domestic Violence 0n Sydney’s credibility as a witness, but 0n her failure t0 make prior
disclosure.

the rape

The Magistrate did not

allegations

Magistrate prior t0

A

cite to

any

rule, statute or case

in her discovery responses,

law requiring disclosure of

0r otherwise requiring disclosure to the

trial.

party has n0 duty to disclose information in discovery not required

speciﬁcally requested

by

interrogatory or court order.

Services, Ina, 160 Idaho 104, 109-10,

Appellant's Brief
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See,

Lepper

v.

by

rule

and not

Eastern Idaho Health

369 P.3d 882, 887-88 (2016); Edmunds

v.

Kramer, 142

13

Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006).

Mark’s only interrogatory speciﬁcally addressing domestic

Violence stated, “Have you, your spouse, 0r any person residing in your household been
investigated, arrested or a party to

United

States,

the incidents

Violence

which

relates t0

any

litigation, in

any court of this

any other

state or

domestic Violence? (Y/N).” (Exhibit Rec. Vol

state in the

3, p. 163.)

Since

had never been reported, the answer was clearly “n0.” Disclosure 0f the domestic

allegations

interrogatory,

was not required by

401

I.R.F.L.P.

or 402,

was not requested by

and was not required by any court order.

Despite Mark’s attempt t0 paint the allegations as a surprise based 0n Sydney’s responses
to speciﬁc interrogatories,

such as grounds for seeking primary custody,

Mark’s own testimony under questioning by

(Tr. p. 373, 375—78),

his attorney during rebuttal establishes the contrary.

Immediately following denial 0f domestic Violence and sexual assault allegations, Mark testiﬁed
as follows:

Q. Has she
A. Yes.

made

other claims like this against

you during the marriage?

Q. In fact, she did so in her discovery, didn't she?
A. Ithink so.
(Tr. p.

407

11.

18-23.)

Mark was

clearly

aware during discovery and prior t0

abuse or domestic Violence could be presented as an issue

There was n0 surprise and no

trial that

sexual

at trial.

failure to disclose information required

by

discovery.

T0

the extent that the Magistrate excluded Sydney’s allegations 0f domestic Violence for failing to

disclose

them

t0 the other party or to the

Court prior to

trial

the Magistrate erred as a matter 0f

law.

Appellant's Brief
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III.

THE MAGISTRATE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION 1N AWARDING PRIMARY CUSTODY T0

FATHER.
A. Factors t0 be Considered in Determining Child Custodv.
In determining child custody, the

trial

court

required t0 consider

is

relevant

all

Idaho Code 32-717(1) provides:

factors.

In an action for divorce the court may, before and after judgment, give such

direction for the custody, care and education of the children 0f the marriage as

may seem

necessary 0r proper in the best interests 0f the children. The court

shall consider all relevant factors

(a)

The wishes 0f the

(b)

The Wishes 0f the child

(c)

The

interaction

Which may

include:

child’s parent 0r parents as t0 his or her custody;
as t0 his 0r her custodian;

and interrelationship of the child with

his or her parent

0r parents, and his or her siblings;
(d)

The

(e)

The character and circumstances 0f all individuals involved;

(f)

The need

(g)
01"

This
that

list

t0

promote continuity and

Domestic Violence as deﬁned
not in the presence 0f the child.

of factors

may be

child’s adjustment t0 his 0r her

is

relevant.

home, school, and community;

stability in the life

of the child; and

in section 39-6303, Idaho

Code, Whether

not exhaustive or mandatory and courts are free to consider other factors

Nelson

v.

Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 715, 170 P.3d 375, 380 (2007). Courts

must, however, take into account Idaho's presumption that

it

is

in the child's best interest t0

maintain frequent and continuing contact with both parents, unless one parent
perpetrator of domestic Violence. LC. § 32-717B; Bartosz

v.

is

an habitual

Jones, 146 Idaho 449, 454, 197 P.3d

310, 315 (2008).

B.

The Magistrate Improperlv Weighed One Fact Above
Prior to separation

caregiver.

trial

—

for the majority 0f the children’s lives

(See, e.g., R. 472, Tr. p.

192222—24, 322225—32311)

the parties, at Mark’s sole insistence,

Appellant's Brief
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All Others

— Sydney was

From

the primary

separation to the date 0f

had a 50/50 custody arrangement. (See

Tr. pp.

15

214:7—

215:23) The Magistrate completely failed t0 weigh these facts or consider the impact 0f the

more reduced time With

children having even

their mother, instead focusing

on a temporary

circumstance of the parties. Based on one temporary, irrelevant fact the Magistrate completely

upended the children’s

lives.

The Magistrate improperly considered Sydney’s temporary employment circumstances
Which changed

work schedule
Silva

v.

Silva,

(as

is

contemplated by her

trial

relevant only t0 the extent

A

testimony) prior to ﬁnal judgment.

it is

“shown

142 Idaho 900, 906, 136 P.3d 371, 377

to affect the well-being

(Ct.

parent’ s

0f the children.”

App. 2006).

Here, there was n0 evidence or factual ﬁnding that Sydney ’s temporary job impacted the
children’s well-being.

The record

is

undisputed that both parents relied on childcare. (R. 473,

20—21) The record included some evidence that one child was behind 0n homework.
216:13—16) But there was no evidence that the child was really in any trouble.
218:7)

More important

Victor. In fact,

there

Sydney had

had not even made the

was n0 evidence
t0

inform

effort t0 set

his ten—year—old son t0 tell

linking the issue t0

Mark 0f the

up an account

issue. (Tr. p.

(Tr.

his

(Tr. p.

pp 217:17—

Sydney 0r her temporary job

in

216:17—18) At the time, Mark

t0 access this information online

him Whether he was doing

W

homework.

(Tr.

and relied on

p 216219—217: 16) The

Court made n0 ﬁnding that Sydney’s temporary work impacted the children, and the record
wouldn’t support one. The issue was never relevant. Further, any relevance

it

could have had

ended by the time of the motion to reconsider because Sydney’s temporary Victor employment

had ended, she was looking for full-time work as a dental

assistant,

local dental ofﬁce (consistent with the plan she testiﬁed t0 at

R. 495

— 497

Court abused

W 5—1
its

1).

The Court acknowledged

discretion

Appellant's Brief
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when

it

and working as needed for a

trial). (Tr.

pp. 278, 285, 393—394;

the issue but failed t0 address

considered Sydney’s temporary

it.

(R. 539)

The

work schedule without any

16

evidence 0f impact 0n the child linked t0 her (rather than Mark). The Court again abused
discretion

When

it

failed to reconsider the matter despite a

Not only did

the Court abuse err

When

basis for the Court’s custody determination.

it

months”

transformed what even in relevant cases

is

all

Moye

(“[A]n abuse 0f discretion

may

similarly failing t0 support

its

v.

t0

evidence was the sole

W 8—9, and 477—78

(weighing

Sydney’s commute in the “winter

other factors in equipoise))

permissible only as “one factor

single dispositive basis for awarding primary custody t0

906, 136 P.3d at 377; see also

this factor, this

(Compare R. 472

476—79 (ﬁnding

in his favor), with R.

change in employment.

considered

Mark’s “ﬂexible schedule” against alleged issues related

Mark;

this

was

The Court thus

among many”

error. Silva,

into the

142 Idaho

was an abuse of

at

Moye, 102 Idaho 170, 172, 627 P.2d 799, 801 (1981)

also occur

Where the court overemphasizes one

factor

.

.

.

thereby

conclusion that the welfare and interests 0f a child Will be best

served by a particular custody award”). The Court’s weighing 0f one temporary fact above
others

its

discretion and the Court’s

award of primary custody

t0

all

Mark should be

reversed.

C. Character and Circumstances 0f the Parties

The Magistrate weighed
evidence 0n record
structured parent.

the “character and circumstances” factor in favor 0f Mark.

time 0f ﬁnal judgment showed the following.

at the

Sydney has the stronger emotional connection with the

struggled With shortcomings or disabilities

and epilepsy, both with
since separation.

their

Both are

parent’s signiﬁcant other.

Appellant's Brief
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in

— Mark With

relationships

Both are bonded

to

children.

is

the

Both

more

parties

alcohol and marijuana, Sydney With food

communication with each

new

Mark

The

other.

Both had made improvements

and both expressed concerns about the other

and capable 0f providing care for the children. At

17

the time 0f trial both parents

worked hours

that interfered with their time t0 provide care for the

children and utilized grandparents t0 varying degrees t0 provide childcare in addition t0 daycare.

The Magistrate’s

more

sole basis for weighing this factor in favor 0f

available in case of emergency, due t0

hour away. The Magistrate did not

cite to

working more

judgment, and consistent With her testimony
her the more available parent.

judgment,

this factor

work

at trial,

schedule.

Furthermore,

Sydney worked

locally,

Based 0n the evidence 0n record

should have been weighed in Sydney’s favor

that

Mark was

whereas Sydney worked an

any evidence, nor was any presented,

children were suffering as a result 0f Sydney’s

made

locally,

Mark was

or, at

a

show

t0

that the

time of ﬁnal

at the

on a schedule

that

time 0f ﬁnal

at the

minimum,

equally.

D. Continuitv and Stability

The Magistrate’s conclusion

that the factor

of continuity and

unsupported by the evidence. The evidence on record

at the

stability favors

Mark

is

time of ﬁnal judgment showed the

following.

Sydney was the primary caregiver When the children were young, because Mark did not

know what
although

to

d0 with or

how

Mark developed

caregiver because

t0 relate to babies.

a parental

bond With

Mark worked long

hours.

(Tr. p.

33, 329.)

the children

As

the children

Sydney continued

t0

grew

older,

be the primary

(Tr. p. 33, 67-8, 322, 325, 329-30.)

Sydney was a

stay—at—home mother from the birth 0f the parties’ ﬁrst child in 2008 until the parties decided t0

start

Roof Rescue

in 2014.

(Tr. p. 322-23.)

“late at night.” (Tr. p. 67, 192, 214, 322.)

bookkeeper for Roof Rescue,
hours.

Sometime during

for socialization

PBL\4819-8678-7749.V1-9/12/19

this

period

Mark would

not get

Sydney worked from home from 2014

(Tr. p. 322-23),

during Which time

this period, the parties

and so Sydney could work.

Appellant's Brief

During

Mark continued

home

t0

to

until

2016

as a

work long

mutually decided t0 put the children in daycare

(Tr. p. 199, 275, 355-56.)

However, Sydney

18

still

when

provided parental care

were not

the children

in daycare

and Mark was

at

work.

(Tr. p.

300.)

Following separation
this

Mark insisted on

a 50/50 custody schedule. (Tr. p 350-5 1 .) During

period Sydney obtained employment t0 support herself and the children.

the time 0f

trial

Sydney would leave home between 8:00 a.m. and 8:30

the boys to school. She

would

return

home around

or 9:00 p.m., but in time to put the children to bed.

and prior

t0 entry

the children off at daycare before school

Mark would

evidence showed that

0n

p. 23-4, 266.)

enough

t0 get

(Tr. 276-77.)

At

the time 0f reconsideration

0f ﬁnal judgment, Sydney worked part-time 0n a limited basis during the day

available for the boys almost anytime they

at least

a.m., late

At

8:00 p.m., though on occasion as late as 8:30

while seeking a more permanent dental assistant job.

and

(Tr. 323-24.)

would need

—

either

utilized grandparent to provide childcare

23, 252, 265-66, 285.)

In truth,

until 5:30

V01

her.

pm.

495-96.)

3, p.

Mark worked
0r

She was therefore

7:00 a.m.

— dropping

(Tr. p. 23-4, 70, 79.)

later.

The

leave the children at daycare until after the daycare closed,

his Fridays with the children,

The children would

(R.

Mark

Mark

did not get

home

until 8:00 0r 8:30 p.m.

be in school or daycare during the day.

when

spent

the “0n duty” parent

little if

was not

Both

available.

(Tr.

parties

(Tr. p.

any more time each day With the children

than Sydney.

The evidence showed

that the children, particularly the oldest, struggled during the 50/50

parenting time period following separation. The oldest child acted out at daycare and
in school.

(Tr. p. 20-21, 78, 286.)

children due t0 her

behind in

work

at school,

acknowledged

that

schedule,

was behind

Despite the argument that Sydney was uninvolved With the

it

was Sydney Who

and immediately notiﬁed Mark.

ﬁrst found out that the oldest child

(Tr. p.

78, 286.) In contrast,

was

Mark

he had not done anything to follow the oldest child’s academic progress other

Appellant's Brief
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than t0

tell

teacher, nor

him

to

do his homework.

was he even

The evidence
and

clear

also

that

Sydney

is

more

the

after school until

them away from him. The boys
during the summer.

(Tr. p.

likely parent to

the oldest child’s

77-78.)

promote continuity

through encouraging a relationship with the other parent.

testiﬁed that if she were awarded primary custody she

weekend from Thursday

name

could not

whether the teacher was male or female.

showed

stability for the children

He

(Tr. p. 78-80.)

still

(Tr. p. 352).

need

would

like

Mark

Monday morning, because

have every other

wouldn’t want

and that she would be willing

their dad”,

Conversely,

“I

t0

Mark

Sydney

t0

t0 take

d0 50/50

testiﬁed that if he were awarded primary

custody he wanted Sydney t0 have every other weekend, Friday through Sunday, and “maybe

one night a week.”
right

0f ﬁrst refusal for child care

children but she

was

away from

if

further testiﬁed that

and

their other parent.

Mark

that

Mark

(Tr. p. 222, 246.)

t0

have a

t0 care for the

he would rather the children be in
clearly

had n0 problem taking the

did not offer any evidence that the children are

suffering as a result 0f their time With their mother.

work

he didn’t want Sydney

he was working or otherwise unavailable

available, (Tr. p. 221-222),

daycare than be with Sydney.
children

He

(Tr. p. 214, 248.)

Instead he testiﬁed the he wanted her t0

instead of being With the Children. (Tr. p. 222, 246.)

The evidence shows

that continuity

by granting primary custody

to the parent

for the majority 0f the children’s lives

the other parent.

this factor in
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is

stability for the children

Who was

would best be preserved

the primary attachment ﬁgure and caregiver

and who would encourage the children’s relationship with

In this case that parent

Mark’s favor

and

is

Sydney, and the Magistrate’s conclusion weighing

not supported by competent and substantial evidence.
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E.

The Domestic Violence
As

Violence

is

is

evident from the statutory scheme of I.C. §§ 32-717 and 32-717B, domestic

a factor that should be considered in this matter, whether or not

As

presence 0f the children.

The evidence showed a

any weight.

physical confrontation and verbal arguments throughout the marriage.

shows a greater

discord. This factor should

occurred in the

previously argued herein, the Magistrate abused his discretion in

failing to consider 0r give this factor

marital rape

it

level

However, the history of

0f dominance and control by Mark, going beyond the mutual

have been weighed

The Magistrate’s decision

history of mutual

t0

in favor

0f granting primary custody to Sydney.

award primary custody 0f the children

t0

Mark was based 0n

an improper weighing of the Section 32-717 factors and was not supported by substantial and

competent evidence.

It

was

therefore an abuse 0f discretion and should be reversed.

THE MAGISTRATE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN SUBSTITUTING HIS PERSONAL OPINION
FOR THE STANDARD 0F LIVING DURING THE MARRIAGE.
IV.

An abuse
by

0f discretion will be found

if the magistrate’s

ﬁndings 0f fact are not supported

substantial evidence or if the magistrate does not correctly apply the law.

151 Idaho 90, 93, 253 P.3d 764, 767 (Ct.

App

561-62, 633 P.2d 1137, 1139-40 (1981)). Idaho

Where

a divorce

is

decreed, the court

2011)(Citing Nicholls

Code

may

§

v.

Moﬂett

v.

Moﬂett,

Blaser, 102 Idaho 559,

32-705(1) provides:

grant a maintenance order if

it

finds

that the spouse seeking maintenance:

(a)

Lacks sufﬁcient property

to provide for his or her reasonable needs;

and
(b) Is

When

unable t0 support himself or herself through employment.

determining reasonable needs "the court

established during the marriage. Stewart
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v.

is t0

take into account the standard 0f living

Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 680, 152 P.3d 544, 551
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(2007); Wilson

v.

Wilson, 131 Idaho 553, 960 P.2d 1262 (1998); Campbell

v.

Campbell, 120

Idaho 394, 404, 816 P.2d 350 (Ct. App. 1991).

With regard

Sydney’s monthly expenses the Magistrate

t0

Her monthly budget shows $6405. However,
reasonable.

Speciﬁcally

this

this court

stated,

does not ﬁnd

budget

this

court has an issue with the amounts listed for

landscape, Misc. household supplies, clothing/dry cleaning, toiletries, legal fees,

education tuition/fees, and camps and extracurricular activities.

Findings and Conclusions

made with

at 10.

(Rec.

V01

3, p.

481.)

No

further ﬁndings or conclusions

ﬁnd

regard t0 Sydney’s expenses. The Magistrate did not

supported by the evidence. The Magistrate did not

ﬁnd

that the expenses

that they differed

were

were not

from those established

during the marriage, nor did the Magistrate provide any explanation 0r analysis as t0

why

“this

court has an issue with the amounts listed.”

The standard

for reasonableness

under Idaho law

is

not what the Magistrate ﬁnds

reasonable, but rather the standard 0f living established during the marriage, and the object 0f a
t0 secure “the

same comforts and

spousal maintenance order

is

have been enjoyed had

not been for the enforced separation."

it

luxuries 0f life as probably

Campbell

Idaho 394, 404, 816 P.2d 350, 358 (Ct. App. 1991). The Magistrate simply
analysis 0f the standard 0f living during the marriage, instead imposing his

Whether 0r not the expenses were reasonable.

v.

would

Campbell, 120

made no ﬁndings

own

0r

opinions as t0

This was an abuse of discretion and the

Magistrate’s decision with regard t0 spousal maintenance should be reversed and remanded.

THE MAGISTRATE ABUSED HIS DISCRETION 1N FAILING T0 AWARD SPOUSAL
MAINTENANCE T0 MOTHER.
V.

A. Reasonable Needs.
Reasonable needs are based upon the standard 0f living during the marriage. Stewart
Stewart, 143 Idaho 673, 680, 152 P.3d 544, 551 (2007).
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Mark

v.

presented a “spartan” monthly
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budget 0f $3,285.00. However,
false

this

budget

are paid

by

accurately reﬂect his true lifestyle, and creates a

Throughout the year Mark makes personal purchases

comparison with Sydney’s budget.

Which

fails t0

the business and then later written off as a business expense for tax purposes.

This includes meals, his truck payment, gas, Lyft rides and even liquor purchases. Although the
full

extent of the ﬁnancial beneﬁt

calculate with exactness,

Sydney testiﬁed
(Tr. p. 326-27.)

it is

Mark

gets

from year-to-year as a business owner

clear that his lifestyle is substantially

that her

supplemented by

is

difﬁcult t0

this beneﬁt.

budget was based 0n the standard 0f living during the marriage.

While Mark presented a lower budget, he did not present any evidence

that Sydney’s submitted

budget had been her standard 0f living during the marriage. In addition,

although a standard 0f living need not be maintained

Campbell, 120 Idaho

at

if the parties lived

beyond

their

means,

404, no evidence was presented that the parties lived beyond their means.

Even With Sydney’s alleged overspending,
positive net worth.

to dispute

Mark

the parties

were current on

testiﬁed that he disagreed with

all their

how much Sydney

marriage, (Tr. p. 42-3, 56-7), though his testimony also established that he

about Sydney’s spending to monitor the parties’ accounts.

obligations and

(Tr. p.

had a

spent during the

was not concerned enough

175.)

Mark

also challenged

Sydney’s budget as not accurately reﬂecting current expenses. This established Sydney’s current
expenses

at

a

minimum 0f $4,920.00

per month, (Tr. 294-303, 308-316). However, neither of these

challenges contradicted Sydney’s testimony that her budget as originally submitted
the standard of living during the marriage.

to dispute

Mark

was

reﬂective of

did not present actual bills 0r any ﬁnancial analysis

Sydney’s testimony. Sydney’s reasonable needs based on the standard 0f living during the

marriage are therefore somewhere between $4920.00 and $6,405.00 per month.

B. Abilitv to Provide and Support
In order to be eligible for spousal maintenance, a party

community property

must

establish that in light of the

division, she lacks sufﬁcient property t0 provide for her reasonable needs,
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and she

is

unable t0 support herself through employment. Moﬁ’ett

P.3d 764 (Ct.App. 201

1).

Both conditions must be met.

less at the

unable to support herself through employment

prong of the

test.

I.C. § 32-705(1)(b).

is

trial,

at

$16 per hour, and

a shortfall of $2,360.00.

at this time,

Sydney was

taxes and Withholdings, and

time of ﬁnal judgment. Even imputing income

With the lower expense estimate 0f $4,920.00, there
is

the time of

month before

earning $16 per hour, or approximately $2,560.00 per

was earning even

At

Id.

Moﬂett, 151 Idaho 90, 253

v.

Clearly Sydney

and therefore meets the second

The question then becomes whether Sydney has sufﬁcient

property to provide for her reasonable needs. I.C. § 32-705(1)(a).

Per stipulation, Sydney was awarded two income producing properties — rental homes —

which

mortgage and management fees together produce a net income of just $425.00 per

after

month.

(Exhibit Rec.

unexpected

costs.

V01

1,

p. 41, 44, 46,

108.)

The Magistrate did not ﬁnd

it

necessary for Sydney t0

order t0 beneﬁt from any possible equity. (Rec. Vol.

cash equalization payment of $233,698.50.

Sydney

will

need these funds

currently

(Rec.

equalization

shortfall

payment

This does not factor in upkeep 0r other

At her

3, p.

2. p.

296.)

these properties in

481-482.) Sydney was also awarded a

current and foreseeable earning capacity,

to support her until retirement

V01

sell

age of 66 and beyond.

Over the next 30

will provide $7,789.95 per year, or

Sydney

is

years, until retirement age, this

$649 per month.

This

still

leaves a

of $1,286 per month. The evidence shows that Sydney lacks sufﬁcient property to meet

her reasonable needs.

The record

lacks

substantial

and competent evidence

t0

support the Magistrate’s

conclusion that Sydney has sufﬁcient property t0 meet her reasonable needs, and therefore the
denial 0f spousal maintenance

Appellant's Brief
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was an abuse of discretion.
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Code

C. Idaho

Once
to

LC.

§

8 32-7050) Factors

the

two prongs 0f the LC.

32-705(1)

§

test

have been met, the court then looks

32-705(2), which provides:

The maintenance order shall be in such amounts and for such periods 0f time
deems just, after considering all relevant factors which may

that the court

include:
(a)

The ﬁnancial resources 0f

the spouse seeking maintenance, including the

marital property apportioned t0 said spouse, and said spouse’s ability t0

meet

his or her needs independently;
(b)

The time necessary

t0 acquire sufﬁcient education

(C)

(d)

and training

t0 enable

ﬁnd employment;

the spouse seeking maintenance t0

The duration 0f the marriage;
The age and the physical and emotional condition of

the spouse seeking

maintenance;
(e)

The

ability

whom

0f the spouse from

maintenance

is

sought t0 meet his 0r

her needs While meeting those 0f the spouse seeking maintenance;
(f)

(g)

The tax consequences t0 each spouse;
The fault 0f either party.

Each of these
1.

factors will

be addressed in

turn.

Svdnev’s Financial Resources and Abilitv t0 Meet Needs Independentlv.

As demonstrated above, Sydney
employment.

Even when

fully

employed

is

unable to meet her present needs through

as a dental assistant, 0r in a position consistent

With her experience as a secretary/bookkeeper, her
limited.

The ﬁnancial resources awarded

needs through retirement,

at

maximum

earning capacity Will be

to her in the divorce Will

be needed t0 meet her

a substantially reduced standard of living.

Sydney therefore

lacks the ﬁnancial resources to meet her needs independently.

Time Necessarv
Employment.
2.

t0

Acquire Sufficient Education and Training

Sydney has a high school diploma and
positions.

full-time

Though she has completed her
employment

little

t0

Find

work experience beyond menial and

dental assistant training program, she

is still

in the ﬁeld.
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clerical

seeking

The Duration 0f the Marriage.

3.

The

parties

were married for ten years, With Sydney being a stay-at-home

mom for six

of those years.
4.

Svdnev’s Age and thsical and Emotional Condition.

Sydney

She has suffered from an eating disorder and from anxiety,

is

though these appear
5.

Mark’s Abilitv
According

to

be under control

at this time.

Own Needs.

t0

Meet His

t0

Mark’s testimony, his needs are lower than Sydney’s.

lifestyle is signiﬁcantly

In addition, his

augmented by the business paying some 0f his expenses. His salary

of $69,000 per year, 0r $5,750 per month

is

more than sufﬁcient

t0

meet

his

own

stated needs

0f $3,285 per month, plus Sydney’s requested spousal maintenance 0f $1,000 per month for ﬁve
years, without having to dip into his substantial pass—through

income from the business.

Tax Consequences.

6.

No

evidence was presented regarding the tax consequences of a spousal maintenance

award.
7.

Fault.

While both

parties played a role in the

breakdown of the marriage, marital

regular, non-consensual forced sex present during the last year of marriage,

that should

is

will

Even

have

the

a serious factor

seeking a spousal maintenance award of $1,000 for ﬁve years.

This was sought in order t0 enable her time t0

feet.

i.e.

be considered in making a spousal maintenance award.

Sydney

her

is

rape,

at this

ﬁnd employment

amount her standard 0f living

to further adjust her standard
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(Tr. p. 327.)

as a dental assistant

Will be reduced,

and get 0n

and she understands

0f living once the ﬁve years expires.

that she

Based on the

26

evidence on record, the Magistrate’s refusal t0 award any spousal maintenance was inconsistent

With
VI.

I.C. §

32-705 and was an abuse 0f discretion.

THE MAGISTRATE ERRED IN HIs ANALYSIS 0F AND FAILURE T0 AWARD ATTORNEY FEES
Code

32-704(3), which provides:

Sydney requested attorney

fees pursuant t0 Idaho

The court may from time

to time after considering the ﬁnancial resources 0f

both parties and the factors

§

.

32-705, Idaho Code, order a

set forth in section

party to pay a reasonable amount for the cost t0 the other party of maintaining
0r defending any proceeding under this act and for attorney’s fees, including

sums

for legal services rendered

and costs incurred prior

to the

0f the proceeding 0r after entry 0f judgment. The court

amount be paid

directly t0 the attorney,

who may

commencement

may

order that the

enforce the order in his

name.

The Magistrate denied

the request, stating,

and 32-705. This court ﬁnds
ability t0

that

pay her own attorney

Sydney attorney

Mark

fees.

“Sydney

is

requesting fees pursuant t0 LC. 32—704

did not bring this action frivolously. Sydney also

For the reasons

set forth above, this

the

Court declines t0 award

fees.”

The Magistrate applied
I.C. § 32-704(3).

It is

the

wrong

standard.

There

is

n0 requirement 0f frivolousness

in

McAﬁ’ee

v.

an analysis Which includes the factors in

I.C. §

32-705.

McAﬂee, 132 Idaho 281, 293, 971 P.2d 734, 746 (Ct.App. 1999)(An award under LC.
is

[sic]

§

32-704

not based 0n prevailing party but rather the court must consider the factors enumerated in I.C.

§ 32-705).

The Magistrate did not address 0r reference

the Section 32-705 factors in denying

attorney fees and for the reasons addressed in the analysis of spousal maintenance, above, his

conclusion that Sydney has the ability to pay her
evidence.

own

attorney fees

For the reasons an award of spousal maintenance

an award 0f attorney fees

is

is

is

not supported by the

appropriate under I.C. § 32-705,

also appropriate. In addition, a disparity in

incomes

is

generally

sufﬁcient to support a conclusion that the party with the higher income should pay a share 0f the
other party's attorney fees pursuant t0 I.C. § 32-704(3). Perez
Appellant's Brief
PBL\4819-8678-7749.V1-9/12/19

v.

Perez, 134 Idaho 555, 558, 9 P.
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3d. 411,

414

(Ct.

App. 2000). Mark has an income

Sydney can only earn approximately $33,000 per

was an abuse of discretion and should be

in excess

year.

of $100,000 per year. In contrast,

The Magistrate’s denial 0f attorney

fees

reversed.

CONCLUSION
The Magistrate

failed to

make ﬁndings 0f

fact,

improperly disregarded evidence of

domestic Violence, improperly weighed factors pertaining to the best interests of the children,

and

his determinations are not supported

by

the evidence.

The Magistrate’s determinations

regarding child custody, spousal maintenance and attorney fees should therefore be reversed.

DATED this

12th day of September 2019

gig Allen M/cNally
SONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant
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